As safe as houses? The Grenfell Tower fire and the tragic failure of building safety

The Grenfell Tower tragedy of 14 June 2017, in West London was a devastating event that claimed 72 lives and left hundreds displaced. Beyond its immediate human toll, the fire has had far-reaching consequences for the construction industry, exposing deep flaws in building regulations, materials usage, and oversight practices.

The Grenfell Inquiry final report, published last Wednesday, sets out a multitude of failures across the government and the private sector and has highlighted the need for systemic reform to ensure the safety of buildings and the people who inhabit them.

The role of cladding in the tragedy

One of the most glaring issues uncovered by the Grenfell Inquiry was the role of combustible cladding. The aluminium composite material, which was compliant with British safety standards, used in the building’s exterior, combined with highly flammable insulation, allowed the fire to spread with deadly speed. Safety tests in 2001 revealed the type of cladding of concern “burned violently”, but the results were kept confidential and the government did not tighten any rules. Years later, in 2009, six people died at a fire at Lakanal House, South London. The coroner at their inquests asked for a review of the building regulations, but the Grenfell Inquiry found, this was “not treated with any sense of urgency”. 

For years, the construction industry has relied on such materials due to their cost-effectiveness, ease of installation, and aesthetic appeal. However, Grenfell has forced companies and regulatory bodies to reconsider whether cost and efficiency were prioritised at the expense of safety. The fire led to the rapid identification of thousands of buildings across the UK and abroad with similarly dangerous cladding, sparking widespread concern and the need for retrofitting projects.

Other broader issues

In 2010 the coalition government lead by David Cameron had set about to reduce regulation on the basis that it was holding back enterprise. The Inquiry found that this attitude dominated decision-making in government and that “even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.”

The Inquiry also found that there was systemic dishonesty by those who made and sold the cladding and the full extent of the dangers were not revealed. Some companies were even found to have made false and misleading claims about the suitability of their cladding. 

These inherent issues were exacerbated by the council’s and contractors’ “persistent indifference” to fire safety standards and the general lack of responsibility for the safety of vulnerable residents. 

The London Fire Brigade has also been criticised for its lack of preparedness. The Inquiry found that fire officers had not been adequately trained and lacked the skills to deal effectively with such a large-scale emergency. Challenges with low water pressure and difficultly evacuating residents all contributed to the disaster. 

The embers burn on…

The Inquiry makes it abundantly clear that the path to the disaster started many years ago and the fuel to the fire has been a series of systemic failures. The Inquiry states that building safety in England and Wales is “seriously defective” and recommends one regulator, answerable to a government minister, so that the industry can be held to account. 

For the construction industry, the post-Grenfell era means that safety is no longer negotiable. Companies must now engage with more stringent fire safety regulations, better testing and certification of materials, and comprehensive assessments of the risks associated with each project. The introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022 in the UK has sought to tighten regulatory oversight, with stricter requirements for contractors, developers, and property owners to ensure the safety of residents. Safety has become an uncompromising cornerstone of future construction.